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default, relating them not only to the general economic conditions and the state of private sector 
balance sheets but also to a range of factors such as the role that limited liability and several 
forms of insurance contracts play in companies' failures. In particular, due to asymmetric 
information and 11 moral hazard 11 problems limited liability seems to favor insolvency. However, 
the use of credit insurance is likely to reduce the cost of capital and thus the probability of 
default, as insurance companies are better suited for screening and monitoring functions. 
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1. Introduction. 
A central tenet in economics and business is that competition drives markets toward a state 
of long-run equilibrium in which inefficient firms are eliminated and those remaining in existence 
produce at a minimum average cost. Consumers benefit from this state of affairs because goods 
and services are produced and sold at the lowest possible prices. A legal mechanism through which 
most firms exit the market is known as insolvency and/or bankruptcy2. 
For both bankruptcy and insolvency procedures, the key economic issue is whether the 
legal and economic screening processes they provide, eliminate only those companies that are 
economically inefficient and whose resources could be bener used in another activity. 
Company insolvencies have increased very sharply in the last few years, and currently stand 
at record levels in many countries3 • Several factors may severely affect corporate default and 
although the combination of recession and high interest rates is likely to have been the main cause 
of this rise in defaults, the more moderate increases in company failures, which have accompanied 
more severe downturns in the past, suggests that other factors may also have been important. 
One important common determinant is the general economic conditions for business (GDP 
growth, inflation, etc.), another is the level of debt. Both capital leverage (debt as a proportion of 
assets) and income gearing (interest payments as a proportion of income), together with higher 
levels of indebtedness, may lead to insolvency. 
Our aim is to explore, in both theoretical and empirical terms, the nature of the relationship 
between debt (level and changes in borrowing), limited liability and company default in cyclical 
economies, characterized by financial instability. The work seeks to provide a survey and critical 
assessment on current economic theory relating to debt and vulnerability to corporate default and 
to offer empirical evidence casting light on the validity of the main theories. We suggest, as well, 
a number of underlying institutional factors (limited liability, bankruptcy procedures, etc.) that may 
help to explain the sharp increase of insolvencies during turbulent periods of the economy. 
The paper is, therefore, concerned with companies' insolvency caused by the inconsistent 
incentives arising in a business contract specifying a fixed value payment between debtor and 
creditor, particularly given limited liability. The debtor prefers the state of affairs, which maximizes 
his wealth while the creditor prefers one that maximizes the expected value of the debtor's 
obligations. Consequently, limited liability, favors corporate insolvency as increases borrowing costs 
and, simultaneously, reduces the amount of funds available. 
To reduce that problem, companies write insurance contracts that promise creditors fixed 
returns while the company is solvent and transfers the assets to the insurers in case of insolvency. 
That in turn incentives "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" problems due to asymmetric 
information that insurance companies are more able to cope with, as economies of scale make it 
economical for screening and monitoring functions to be undertaken by an institution rather than 
individuals. 
2 M.ny fi=s, howev.r, .xit the m.rk.t prior to in.olv.ncy by w.y of liquid.tion or 
.cquisition (of the fi= or of the fi='. productiv•••••t.). Informal compo.ition. (volunt.ry transf.rs 
of .ss.ts or .h.r.s to cr.ditors) oft.n occur prior to in.olv.ncy. It would b. int.r.sting to .xplore wh.t 
br.akdowns in debtor-cr.ditor b.rg.ining mu.t take pl.c. in ord.r for • fi= to .void • volunt.ry, pre-
.mptive solution and thus .nter fo=.l d.bt r.li.f proc••dings, but this will b. out.id. the scop. of this 
work. 
3 Ad.m Smith (1776) in • w.ll known p••••g. of "Th. W••lth of N.tions" m.ntions th.t "After 
.11 our compl.ints of the fr.cu.ntcy of bankruptcies. the unh.ppy m.n who f.ll into this misfortune m.ke 
but. very sm.ll p.rt of the whole numb.r .ng.ged in tr.de, and .11 oth.r sort of business; not much more 
p.rh.ps th.t one in • thous.nd." 
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2. Corporate Insolvencies. 
In the last few years, financial distress and companies insolvencies' had both risen sharply 
in many countries and, occasionally, reached levels not seen in previous recessions4 • Although 
business failures occur everywhere, in this chapter we will concentrate on corporate indebtedness 
and company failures in Spain. In 1992 company insolvencies reached 1,642 companies (around 
0,18% of the total registered companies) compared with 1,150 (0,13%) and 483 (0,06%) in the 
equivalent period one and two years earlier. Of the former figure 1135 (0,12%) cases were 
technical (as well as legal) insolvencies and the remaining 507 (0,06%) bankruptcies (Table 1). 
1U!L1 
Intolvencle••nd hnkruptcl.. In Sp.ln: Comp.nie••nd U'b!litie. Involved 11955-19921. 
COMPANIES LIABILITIES 
Number of Comp.nle. Involved (Thou••nd Million Pe..t••, 
YEAR In.olvenc. Bankrupt. Total Co. In.oIvenc. Benkrupt. Tot.1 L. 
1955 85 58 143 179 .. 5 22.. 
1956 7.. 38 112 2.. 5 64 309 
1957 85 .. 6 131 335 75 .. 10 
1958 76 .. 5 121 25.. 12 266 
1959 186 46 232 1131 176 1307 
1960 92 37 129 ..27 115 542 
1961 91 "7 138 741 113 85.. 
1962 112 50 162 796 131 927 
1963 165 41 206 1898 107 2005 
1964 157 ..3 200 1750 252 2002 
1965 123 39 162 1550 517 2067 
1966 145 37 182 5667 203 5870 
1967 207 53 260 .. 565 ..70 5035 
1968 169 51 220 32.. 9 635 388.. 
1969 172 55 227 3373 188 3561 
1970 325 .. 8 373 9922 399 10321 
1971 218 .. 7 265 7617 529 81 .. 6 
1972 142 56 198 3671 924 .. 595 
1973 120 53 173 3767 268 .. 035 
1974 308 56 36.. 25.. 5.. 2230 2768.. 
1975 32 .. 72 396 24638 2375 27013 
1976 386 100 486 32073 2501 3"57" 
1977 531 87 618 5103.. 2436 53470 
1978 598 117 715 9.. 779 4248 99027 
1979 711 126 837 98789 6533 105322 
1980 815 133 9.. 8 10.. 7.... 22818 127562 
1981 820 143 963 129147 8231 137378 
1982 893 152 10.. 5 189183 11056 200239 
1983 841 159 1000 170.. 97 18913 189410 
1984 814 165 979 131963 20278 152241 
1985 ..59 136 595 10133.. 13228 11.. 562 
1986 231 
" 
328 54710 8851 63561 
1987 192 96 288 .. 6128 6872 53000 
1988 15.. 84 238 38148 21537 59685 
1989 168 97 265 36455 3676 .. 0131 
1990 351 132 .. 83 100846 23352 124198 
1991 798 352 1150 39.. 684 47929 ....2613 
1992 1135 507 1642 101465.. 83236 1097890 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Bstadistica (INB) 
4 According to Altman, S.I. (1993, p. 3): "As we entered the decade of 1990s corporate 
distress in the United States, and in many other countries of the world, reached levels not .een since the 
great depression of the 1930's." 
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Comprenhensive data for total liabilities of failed firms, which will indicate, whether the 
companies are of similar size and failure rates (failures as a proportion of active or registered 
companies) have followed a similar pattern, although it should be noted that the empirical aproach 
is largely qualitative, in that a degree of causation is inferred without rigorous stadistical test, albeit 
with theoretical support. 
Several factors may affect both corporate insolvencies and bankruptcies, but one important 
common determinant is the debt level. Both capital leverage (debt as a proportion of assets) and 
income gearing (interest payments as a proportion of income), with higher levels of indebtedness 
are associated with a greater likelihood that fixed contractual obligations to creditors (principal plus 
interest payments) cannot be met. Companies who have taken out loans on illiquid assets or assets 
whose value subsequently fails are particularly vulnerable. 
Corporate indebtedness and the cost of debt has been growing, in Spain as weel as many 
other countries, but at a much lower level than the rise in corporate defaults will suggest. In the 
late 1980 . s there was a reduction in both, corporate leverage (from almost 55% of total net assets 
in 1983 to less than 45% in 1990) and the cost of debt (from 14,8% in 1983 to 11,7% in 1988). 
However with the downturn of the decade the level of indebtedness has been increasing again to 
almost 50% (49,1 %) of net assets and, also, its explicit cost to 12,3%, in 19925 • Although much 
of this increase seems to have been voluntary for financing of new projects, as debt became more 
available than equity, the fall of aggregate demand during the recession has left companies in an 
exposed position. 
In general, while is possible to find several explanations for companies' willingness to 
become more indebted in the past few years, it is less clear that the shift in financial structure is 
actually beneficial in the end. Companies may have made rational decisions regarding the short-
term cost of funds, and well informed shareholders and creditors may have been given more 
opportunity to allocate resources among firms most efficiently but, given that many firms seem to 
have made limited progress in improving the management of risk in the past decade, their resulting 
financial position makes them more vulnerable than otherwise in the face of economic downturn. 
Broadly speaking, default occurs when a borrower does not pay interest or repay principal 
due to its creditors. This may lead to bankruptcy (a court supervised process of breaking and 
rewriting contracts), liquidation (sale of fim's assets and distibution to claimants) or private 
renegotiations of contracts (workouts). It may arise because shareholders declare themselves 
unable to pay their debts, either because the market is unwilling to advance more credit or even 
if further credit is available. leaving the creditors to recover such assets as they may. A key 
distinction is between default caused by illiquidity (inability to pay debts owing to lack of realisable 
assets or income) and bankruptcy (negative net worth. liabilities exceed assets). 
This has implications at a macroeconomic and corporate level. particularly as the evidence 
from company accounts suggests that firms in the private sector have increased their leverage and 
several studies. have found that higher leverage has served to magnify the multiplier in recession6 • 
In relation to past experience. the extent of the rise in corporate sector indebtedness has been more 
limited. but similar conclusions may be valid. Anecdotal evidence. on the causes of recent company 
failures, suggest that relatively highly levered companies were often unable to survive in the face 
of sustained high interest rates (i1iquidity) and reduced demand during most parts of 1980s and the 
early 1990s (Table 2). 
s Data ha. been collected, since 1983 by the "Central de Balances del Banco de Sspafia·, a 
public organization that is part of the Central Bank and collect. data from a sample of thousand. of 
companle. (7512 in 1990), all over Spain. 
6 See Bernanke, B. and Campbell, J. "Is there a corporate debt crisis?·, Brooking. Paper. 
on Economic Activity, nr.1 (1988). 
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COMPANIES INSOLVENCIES 
Ceu.e. mentioned by Companie. 
LACK OF LOW 
YEARS ILIQUIDITY DEMAND PRODUCTIVITY OTHER CAUSES 
Compenie. Percentege Compenle. Percentege Compenle. Percentage Companle. Percentage 
1982 5~8 66,~7 15~ 17,81 28 3,14 108 12, O~ 
1983 573 68,13 125 14,86 25 2,'7 118 14,03 
1984 589 72,36 100 12,2' 23 2,83 102 12,53 
1985 314 68,41 72 15,6~ 15 3,27 58 12,64 
1986 154 H," 36 15,58 2 0,87 39 16,88 
1~87 
1988 
121 
101 
64,02 
65,58 
32 
21 
16,'3 
13,64 
4 
4 
2,12 
2,60 
32 
28 
16,'3 
18,18 
1~8~ 10~ 65,27 20 11,'8 3 1,80 35 20,'6 
1~~0 233 66,38 57 16,24 5 1,42 56 15,'5 
1991 475 5~,08 150 18,66 17 2,11 162 20,15 
1~~2 661 58,24 226 19, '1 22 1,'4 226 1~,'1 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Bstad1stica (INB) 
2.1 Debt and the economic cycle. 
Although the combination of recession and a greater volatility of company incomes is likely 
to have been the main cause of this rise in defaults, a number of factors, including increased 
leverage and higher interest rates, may also have contributed to higher corporate default. While the 
probability of bankruptcy is a positive function of firm leverage, it is affected by other conditions 
as we11 7 • 
Fisher (1932) anributed the downturn in the business cycle to overindebtedness and 
deflation. The earlier upswing is caused by an exogenous event leading to improved opportunities 
for profitable investment. This leads to increased fixed investment, as well as speculation in asset 
markets for capital gain. The process is debt-financed, mainly by bank loans (also by trade credit) 
which increases deposits, the money supply, and the price level. Velocity also increases, further 
fueling the expansion. Rising prices reduce the real value of outstanding debt, offsetting the 
increase in nominal debt, and encouraging further borrowing. This leads to a state of 
"overindebtedness", i.e. a degree of indebtedness which multiplies unduly the chances of being 
insolvent (or alternatively a state of indebtedness implying a negative present value of borrowers 
in many states of nature). 
When agents have insufficient liquid assets to meet liabilities, a cnSIS can be triggered. 
Debtors unable to pay debts and refinance positions can be forced by creditors to liquidate (distress 
selling). Each individual hopes to be better off by liquidating but the community is worse off due 
to deflation. If normal interest rates are "sticky", real rates increase. Bank runs are triggered as 
fears for their solvency increase, especially as falling prices reduce companies' net worth and 
profits and lead to loan defaults. Output and employment fall until bankruptcy has eliminated 
overindebtedness, or reflationary monetary policy is adopted. The process then repeats itself. 
7 There is of course a link between debt and the underlying economic conditions, including 
the economic cycles. Leverage is interest sensitive and not exclusively a firm-driven determinant. In a low 
interest rate environment (vis-a-vie ROI), greater leverage is often advised, even if the volatility of 
interest rates (which includes falling ROI) that make excessive leverage a problem. 
5 
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This approach regards financial crises as an essential component of the business cycle. It 
can be seen as a response to previous "excesses" which can operate through a variety of financial 
markets. Davis (1992) elaborated Fisher's approach, and introduced the concepts of "fragility", to 
anempt to clarify the problem of overindebtedness during an upswing. Fragility depends on; first, 
the mix of hedge and speculative finance; second the liquidity of portfolios; and third, the extent 
to which ongoing investment is debt-financed. Hedge financing occurs when a unit's cash-flow 
commitments to debt servicing are such that cash receipts exceed cash payments over a long 
period; speculative financing entails cash payments over a short period that exceeds cash-flows 
receipts. 
Firms obviously would like to avoid the costs of financial insolvency. The best remedy is 
to avoid distress in the first place, but this requires the operating activities of the firm to be 
managed efficiently to its changing environment. 
Economic downturns and declines in earnings cannot always be anticipated, but it should 
be noted, however, that the phenomenon of non-intencional insolvency is not, as is often heard, 
resulting from the occurrence of "unforseen" events. Companies go bankrupt because of "bad 
choices" made in the past, these choices make them unable to meet conditions on its debt. 
Insolvency in an economic sense is, therefore, contingent on the expectations of future cash-flows 
and on the possibilities of feasible remedies (legal procedures, insurance, etc.). 
However, even if a link exists, in theory, between debt and default, in one side, and the 
economic cycle, on the other, the 'relationship cannot be studied in isolation, but in the context of 
other factors that may lead to default. An important factor is the legal framework for insolvencies 
and bankruptcy procedures. Failure rates are likely to differ between countries as a consequence 
of the definition of insolvency and the bankruptcy laws. 
Although international comparisons do reveal some differences in insolvency laws, which 
may affect their usage, incidence and cost, there are still a set of common procedures in many 
countries in Europe and the United States. These procedures range from outright liquidation through 
a set of informal reorganizations methods that will allow companies to explore their prospects for 
survival 8 . Caution is, therefore, needed, when making direct comparisons of default levels across 
countries, even if differences in the level of failure rates are not particularly marked and should not 
influence trends and determinants of failure, which are the main focus of the current paper. 
However, although these factors are important, they are unlikely to explain why default 
rates have risen so rapidly during 1990-1993 compared with the early and late 1970'S9. In 
general, the number of insolvencies and company liquidation rates (insolvencies as a proportion of 
the total number of companies) are at record levels and higher than the sharp fall in the GDP will 
suggest. 
Alternative definitions and types of financial distress are discussed in the literature. 
Coperland and Weston (1992, p. 11(5) explained at least the following related technical terms: 
Failure: In economic terms failure means a company is losing money and, in some way, may refer to insolvency. 
Technical default: Occurs when a firm fails to meet one or more conditions of its debt covenants.  
Technical insolvency: cash-flows are insufficient to meet interest payment or principal on specified dates.  
BanknJptcy: Is a legal as well as an accounting measure, meaning a negative net worth (outstanding financial 
obligations are lower than the ·fair value market of firm'S assets· or (economically) lower than the present 
value of expected cash-flows. 
9 Evidence of financial distress has become more widespread: Altman (1993, p. 7) provides 
data for the United States: During the 1970s, about 29,000 to 35,000 business entities filed each year for 
protection to either liquidate or reorganize under the Backruptcy Laws. The number increased to 44.000 in 
1980 and averaged over 60.000 per year from 1983 to 1991, with a high of almost 90.000 in 1987. In Europe 
lIIore than 233.000 companies filled for insolvency procedures in 1993 (Credit Union Association, Dusseldorf). 
In some countries as Prance or Germany, bankruptcies increased by 30t compared with 1992. 
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2.2 Credit Risk. 
Credit risk is the risk faced by a lender or creditor due to the possibility that the debtor may 
fail to honor his financial obligation. It is often distinguished from market risk or financial risk 
resulting from the effect of general market conditions (such as inflation, interest rates or exchange 
rates) on the value of the repayment. 
Though it applies more broadly, credit risk, is most naturally viewed in the context of a 
standard debt contract. Such a contract demands a non-contingent repayment at a future date; if 
this repayment is not made, the debtor is declared to be in default. Default may be due to feasibility 
constraints, if the debtor has insuficient resources to meet the terms of the contract, or it may be 
due to incentive constraints, if the creditor cannot adequately enforce the contract. 
There are many misconceptions regarding debt. because debt, unlike any other 
"commodity", entails a "promise" to pay an amount and the fulfilment of this promise is by its 
nature uncertain and can include many additional features. Debt has a negative as well as a positive 
side. If debt rises significantly relative to firm assets, various added costs are incurred by the firm. 
In their mildest form, these costs are manifested in the unwillingness of customers and suppliers 
to deal with the company with the firm under market conditions. In more serious cases, debt 
holders can be asked to voluntary forgo a portion of their claims to keep the firm solvent. As 
leverage rises further, the firm can experience technical default or, in the extreme, economic 
insolvency (Masulis, 1988). 
The relation between finance and imperfect information requires considerations of 
differences in the reward structure associated with debt and equity. In a context where is costly 
for outside investors to verify the earnings of a firm, a standard debt contract is optimal. Such a 
contract makes owners residual claimants in all states where the firm is not in default but transfers 
remaining assets to creditors where default occurs. Equity offers residual claims in non-bankrupt 
states and nothing in the event of bankruptcy. 
The key difficulty is raised by the uncertain possibility that the borrower will default, given 
asymmetric information, and incomplete contracts '0. If there were no costs of bankruptcy, default 
risk would be of no concern to business: assets to payoff the loan would pass smoothly to the 
lender in the case of default. In practice, resolution of default takes time and effort and companies 
take measures to avoid it". However, in practice, and due to asymmetries in information, the 
lender faces a problem of screening potential borrowers before making an advance, and monitoring 
their behavior after the loan is made, both of which impose costs to the lender. Davis (1992) 
explain this phenomenon succintly as follows: 
"First, the lender needs to choose borrowers of high credit quality before the loan is 
granted, to minimize his losses due to default, when due to asymmetric information it may not be 
possible to distinguish good and bad risks. This is the problem of "adverse selection". The classic 
example of adverse selection is the "'emons problem" which Akerlof (1970) applied to the used-car 
10 Complete contracte would epecify the behaviour of the borrower under every possible 
contingency. 
11 That can mean, 1919 well, a loes to the lendere, becauee what they will get i. the 
antlcipated value of the secured aeeete, not their actual value upon paeeoff. 
7 
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market12 • Related to debt, the problem arises because, with asymmetric information, the lender 
does not know whether the borrower is a good risk (a good investment project at low risk) or a bad 
risk (high-risk, low-quality investment project). If the lender cannot distinguish the latter (the 
lemons), he will charge an interest rate reflecting the average quality of good and bad borrowers. 
Hence high-quality borrowers pay more than they should, and low rather less. Some quality 
borrowers will drop out the market, thus worsening the mix. Higher interest rates will only make 
the problem worse; the mix worsens further as only low-quality borrowers with a low probability 
of repayment are willing to pay such rates. Suitable collateral'3 may be one way to protect the 
lender from adverse selection, 8S it provides compensation even if the borrower turns out to be 
low-quality, and defaults. 
Second, the lender must monitor the borrower after the loan is granted to ensure that the 
borrower is not acting contrary to his interest during the period that the loan is outstanding. For 
example the borrower might use the funds to engage in high risk activities that entail only a low 
probability that the loan will be repaid; this is the problem of "moral hazard". Moral hazard (and the 
expenditures incurred to overcome it) are a form of the agency costs arising from separation of 
principal (lender) and agent (borrower). It arises generally from the inconsistent incentives of a 
contract specifying a fixed value payment between debtor and creditor, particularly given limited 
liability. " 
The agency costs arising from the inherent conflict of interes between stockholders and 
creditors have implications for the existence of various features of debt contracts. Smith and 
Warner, show that issuing Convertible debt (or warrants) can lesser stockholders' incentives to 
support investments in projects that are unprofitable but increase firm risk. In short, however, debt 
and equity conflicts of interest can be reduced but not eliminated by existing debt contracts. 
12 The basic point is that, given uncertainty as to whether a second-hand car market is a 
"lemon", buyers assume all cars are lemons, prices fall, and the sumption is self-fulfilling. because only 
owners of lemons seek to sell at low prices. Ultimately no trade may take place. 
13 Subject to the difficulties of resale and recovery. 
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3. Limited Liabilitv. 
The risk of bankruptcy and financial distress highlights the fact that conflicts of interest 
between stockholders and various fixed payment claimants exist. These conflicts exist because the 
firm's fixed claims bear default risk while stockholders have limited liability residual claims and 
influence the managerial decision process. 
The "adverse selection" argument for debt is simply that managers, acting in shareholders' 
interests, have better knowledge of either f(l) or the distribution or expectation than does the 
market. The "moral hazard" argument is that it is easier to align the incentives of managers and 
owners if a company issues debt instead of equity, but the credit risk resulting from limited liability 
also introduces the possibility that the borrower may take unobservable actions that affect his 
ability to repay. 
To address the role of limited liability on corporate insolvencies, in this context, consider 
a simple firm that must divide its balancesheet so that, 
Balance 
Assets lA) Liabilities (Ll 
C E 
I o 
Firm liabilities, L, are divided between Equity, E, and Debt, 0, being E+° = L, and its 
assets, A, are also separated between cash, C, and investments, I, so that C + I = A. Company' 
value for the shareholders is, therefore, 
Vt = Et = (At· Ot) 
Further assume that the return on investment is risky, and will equal k (I), where Elk) = 1. 
All investors are risk neutral, the riskless interest rate equals kr, and the company has a debt of 0, 
payable after the returns on its investment are realized. There is some chance that IC +k(\)] > 0, 
so equity has some value, but there is also a chance that k (I) will be too low to pay all debt, and 
default will occur. Of course, reality is a bit more complicated. 
A simple extension is to allow the marginal product of investment to vary, so that an 
investment of I returns k ft\). This reflects a firm with stochastic assets and liabilities that has a 
positive probability of insolvency. 
Some authors analyze the conflict of interest between debt and equity owners, taking the 
perspective that the common stock of a levered firm is equivalent to a call option. The value of the 
debt falls below the value of a fixed return security by the expected value of limited liability'4 to 
shareholders and can be calculated as the value of an option with exercise price equal to the face 
value of the principal plus interest and a variability equal to that of the assets of the firm. 
14 The importance of limited liability in this context is that the Shareholder in the 
borro~in9 company benefits from the returns from a successful outcome, but cannot be forced to a share in 
the losses. The value of the shareholder"s equity cannot go below zero. 
9 
The firm is observed at a start date, time zero, when A = AO and L = LO. Assets and 
liabilities are carried out for one period, when the debt (D) must be discharged (paid). If we define 
the value of equity as E (A, 0, tl. and the value of the promise to pay creditors 0 (A, L, tl. where 
t is the time for maturity of debts. Is easy to see that the value of firm equity is equivalent to an 
European call option's. Thus, E = (A,D,O) = Max. (A-O,O) and at expiration day the equity (E) 
ownership right is (At - Ot) if the firm is solvent and 0 if the firm is insolvent. The value of the debt 
for creditors is Min. (Ot, At). If the firm is solvent creditors receive the value of their claims, but 
if the firm is insolvent the equity owners default, turning over the remaining assets to the creditors. 
In this case the payment received at t, is not Dt, but 
Min. (Ot, Atl = Ot· Max. (Ot-At, 0) 
or 
Max. (At-Ot, 01 = (At-Ot) + Max. (Ot·At. 01 
The value of this option will be priced in higher premia on interest rates (k) on risky loans 
(DO) charged to the firm (shareholders) in solvent states (Merton, 1974), as 
rt Ot 
e = . 
DO 
then, 
rt El Ot • Max (Ot·At. Oil 
e = . 
DO 
rt 
Ot • (e .. DO) = E[Max (Ot·At, OIl 
the value of a firm with limited liability is, 
rt 
EI(At-Ot) + Max. (Ot·At. Oil = E(Ot) • (e .. DO) 
The right side of equation is the value of an unlimited liability fims with the same assets and 
that borrows DO at t. Consequently is financially equivalent for a company to lend at a risky rate 
k with limited liability or at rate r with unlimited responsability. Attempts to compensate for these 
agency problems through charging higher interest rates may be counterproductive. Higher interest 
rates raise the range of states over which firms are bankrupt. Owners choosing low risk 
investments drop out of the market (adverse selection) and "moral hazard" problems are 
exacerbated. 
IS As a result of the call-put parity, limited liability can a180 be .een a. a put option: 
That is, the equity holders can "put" the a.8ets to the debt holder at the "price" of the indebtedne8s, even 
when the asset. are worth le88 than thi•. 
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As a consequence, higher interest rates may yield lower returns to creditors and as Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) have noted credit rationing may result. Credit rationing is a condition of loan 
markets in which the lender supply of funds is less than borrower demand at the quoted contract 
terms. The risk of default is a source of credit rationing if, due to assymetric information, there is 
no interest rate at which the market for credit can clear and some borrowers are constrained in the 
amount of credit they can raise. 
The implications of these conflict interests have been explored by a number of researchers, 
including Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977) and Masulis (1988). The consistent message 
in these papers is that these conflicts create incentives for stockholders to take actions that benefit 
themselves at the expense of creditors and that not necessarily maximize firm value. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that rational investors are aware of these conflicts and 
the possible actions firms can take against creditors. Thus when loans are made they are 
discounted inmediatly for the expected losses these anticipated actions would induce. This 
discounting means that, on average, stockholders do not gain from this actions, but firms 
consistently suffer by making suboptimal decisions. If the firm is confronted with a choice between 
investment and debt reduction, it will continue to invest past the efficient point. Then creditors will 
prefer a debt reduction to investment and, since there are no efficiencies, stockholders must prefer 
investment. 
However, if the actions of.the owners (managers or shareholders) are unobservable several 
complications arise. First, asset substitution. Since the owner only benefits from returns in non· 
default states, risky investments of given mean return will be chosen in preference to safer 
investments (moral hazard). Owners benefit from the upside gains from high risk investments but 
do not bear the costs of downside losses. Those are inflicted on creditors rather than shareholders. 
This is the standard result that debt can cause firms to take on uneconomic projects simply to 
increase risk and shift wealth from creditors to stockholders. 
Secondly, underinvestment. Owners do not benefit from the effort that they apply to 
improve returns in insolvency states. Those accrue for creditors not owners. Since some of the 
returns to investments accrue to bondholders in bankrupt states, firms may be discouraged from 
carrying out what would otherwise be profitable investments (Myers, 1977). 
Thirdly, claim dilution. There is an incentive for owners to issue debt that is senior to 
existing debt. Senior debt has priority over existing debt in the event of bankruptcy; it can therefore 
be issued on more favorable terms than existing debt which leaves existing creditors' claims intact 
in the event of bankruptcy. 
Modern theory identifies the market failures created by moral hazard and adverse selection 
as a consequence of assymetric information. Assymetric information leads to credit rationing when 
the interest rate or the loan size chosen by the lender affects borrower behaviour (moral hazard) 
or the riskiness of the applicant (adverse selection). 
These divergences of interests between creditor and owners create incentives to bind 
owners' interest to those of creditors. One way to do this is to put aside collateral (property of the 
borrower wich must be forfaited to the creditor in case of default) or to use covenants preventing 
owners to take actions that are detrimental to the interest of creditors. However, these provisions 
can moderate but not eliminate agency problems. If debt markets are competitive, shareholders will 
pay (in the initial borrowing termsl for any investment inefficiencies. 
Of course, both debtors and creditors are aware of all these problems when they write their 
initial contracts. Thus firms, employ a variety of protective covenants to avoid credit rationing and 
aimed at assuring creditors that they will be well treated in case of default. One of them, perhaps 
the most ancient for the purpose of shifting risks, is insurance. 
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4. Credit Insurance. 
In any economic situation, there is a responsible agent on whom the burden of any given 
risk fall in the first instance. In case of default the owner of the business typically is supposed to 
assume all the risks of uncertainty, paying out the unexpected losses and enjoying the unexpected 
gains. Remedies, however, are disruptive and society has long recognized the need for permitting 
to shed some risks through a series of institutions (market mechanisms, legal procedures, etc.) 
Insurance itself, is an early and important example of such an institution, but other ways 
for risk shifting have also emerged. The most important institution is, as we have seen, limited 
liability. By this means, the owner of a business could divest himself of some of the risks, 
permitting others to share in the benefits and losses. 
As Arrow (1971) mentioned in a seminal article "The possibility of shifting risks, of 
insurance in the broadest sense, permits creditors to engage in risky activities which they would 
not otherwise undertake." Under such a system credit activity and risk-bearing can be divorced, 
each being carried out by the one or ones best qualified. It must be pointed out, though, that the 
range of insurance policies required by this ideal system is indeed very wide and one can see that 
not all the risks can be effectively" shifted through the market. 
The economic system, therefore, has not developed a more completely adequate set of 
markets for risk-bearing and insurance operations are limited in several ways and for many reasons; 
In the first place, insurance is limited as to scope. Many risks are classified as 
"uninsurable", although this concept is not absolute. Secondly, insurance is frequently limited as 
to the amount of actual loss, or even less in many cases. A third limitation of insurance from the 
economic point of view is its resort to direct controls over the insured. But the "moral hazard" 
factor is perhaps the most important: The insurance policy might itself change incentives and 
therefore the probabilities upon which the insurance company has relied. 
Risk enters necessarily into all credit contracts, but only as one element among others. Any 
loan has, after all, the risk of default, and the rate of interest is in fact greater on loans judged risky 
by the market than for safer ones; the interest rate differential is in effect a premium paid by the 
borrower for insurance against default, the lender being simultaneously the insurer. 
The incomplete shifting of risks gives rise to problems which have been recognized by 
society and solved in different ways. A corporation or its creditors would wish to be insured against 
default arising in unforseen circumstances. A solution to the inability to shift risks is represented 
by bankruptcy and limited liability laws. The law in effect requires creditors to assume some risks 
of the debtor; it does not leave him free to negotiate a risk-free investment and it provides for an 
inalienable limitation of risks to the debtor. The law thus steps in and forces a risk-shifting not 
created by the market place. 
There are reasons for lenders, however, to shift the risks to institutions in the form of credit 
insurance. If companies dislike uncertainty and they can find some institution to whom the cost of 
bearing the uncertainty is less than for them, then there will be some trade possible, by which the 
party assumes the risk, the company pays a fixed premium, and both are better off. Insurance 
companies are better placed to take screening and monitoring functions, as economies of scale 
make it economical for these tasks to be undertaken by an institution rather than individuals. 
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A second solution comes through the shifting of trade and credit risk to an insurance 
company: Credit insurance. Corporations regularly enter into explicit and implicit long-term 
contracts (trade credit contracts,e, labor and service contracts, product guarantees, etc.). 
Creditors, employees, customers and suppliers will make rational forecasts of the payoffs under 
their respective contracts, reflecting the forecast in their reservations prices. With no contracting 
costs, if the firm chooses to purchase credit insurance, thus reducing the probability of contract 
noncompliance, creditors, suppliers and employees' demand prices change to reflect the different 
payoffs. Consequently, the sum of the contract price changes must equal the insurance default 
premium and the value of the firm will not be affected". 
At first sight, this seems to work in the right direction, as claimholders with undivisible 
claims, like customers, trade creditors or managers and employees, are at comparative 
disadvantage in risk bearing's. If the contracting process is expensive, incentives exist to allocate 
risk to those agents who have a comparative advantage in risk bearing. The eQuityholders and 
bondholders of the corporation have divisible claims which are traded in organized secondary 
markets. 
We suggest that insurance firms have a comparative advantage in monitoring certain 
aspects of the firm's real activities and in claims administration services (economies of scale and 
gains from specialization, legal representation and adjusters' network, etc.) so that a firm which 
purchases insurance will engage in a different set of activities that a firm which does not's. 
Insurance contracts allow··the firm to shift risk to the insurance company, achieving an 
efficient location of risk forthe firm's other claimholders. Credit insurance may, therefore, reduce 
risk premium in companies' cost of capital and thus, our analyses suggest, the higher the 
employees, customers and suppliers' fraction of the claims to the firm's output, the higher the 
probability that the firm will purchase insurance. 
The existence of transaction costs of bankruptcy can induce firms with widely dispersed 
ownership to purchase credit insurance, even if the premium is actuarially unfair, provided the 
difference is smaller than the present value of the reduction in expected bankruptcy costs. 
Evidence suggests that bankruptcies' costs are a small percentage of firm value and less than 
proportional to firm size20 • Small corporations will grant rather than receive trade credit (due to 
lack of bargaining power) and therefore, they are more likely to purchase insurance than large 
firms. However, even small transactions costs of bankruptcy will be enough to induce firms to 
purchase insurance. 
16 Trade credit, provided between non-financial firms is particularly important in this 
respect because the amount outstanding is, generally, of the same order of magnitud as business loans. 
17 Not all creditors. however, make use of credit insurance contracts, as some have some 
alternat1ves: Workmen's and managers compensation laws have been enacted in many countries. These laws 
impose on employers the responsability of providing insurance's funds covering wages, salaries and different 
compensations. Deposi t Insurance provides protection for customers' against bank's default and several other 
financial responsability insurance contracts are regularly purchased by corporations. 
18 We must assume that ie 'IlOre expensive for the employees, suppliers and customers to 
purchase the insurance than for the firm, because of economies of ecale and "moral hazard" problems. 
19 The extent of these protective measures taken by ineunce companies ie limited by the 
contracting costs of their originating, monitoring and enforcing. 
20 Gordon and Malkiel (19S1) estimated direct corporate bankruptcy costs to be between 2.S 
and 9' of the market value of the firm, Altman (1984) suggested direct corporate bankruptcy costs of 6' of 
assets. Weiss(1990) offers more recent evidence again ehowing low direct costs of around 3' of assets. 
Warner (1977) consider on empirical evidence that, even for large firms, the direct legal and administrative 
costs default are so low as to be trivial. 
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Insurance. however, involves a change in the attitudes of management and creditors, which 
in turn, raises a problem of "moral hazard". Credit insurance may act under certain circumstances 
as an incentive to bankruptcy as allows managers to gamble with creditor's money even when 
doing so is economically inefficient or against insurers' interest. 
Higher variance of returns may result in a greater chance for benefits and losses. The 
entrepreneur will enjoy the benefit of the increased chance of high returns, while once the 
probability of default is spotted with positive probability, the increased chance of loss is borne (to 
at least some degree) by the insurer. 
In this world, if insurance premium is low enough, it may be that all companies wish to 
write credit insurance contracts, but that insurers have an insuffient amount of capital to satisfy 
demand at this price. Under normal circumstances, the respon~e would be to raise insurance 
premia, reducing the demand. However, entrepreneurs with the riskiest projects will be willing to 
pay for the higher premia. 
When companies go into default, this may have direct effects on other companies that are 
suppliers (or customers) of goods and services. Inmediate problems may arise that threaten therir 
liquidity; if stock has been received but not paid for, then the supplier may not be repaid in full 
and/or be paid late. Such potential problems, even if not realized, may in turn make suppliers of the 
defaulting firm unwilling to exten4 credit. 
In many cases, the default premium paid by insured creditors will increase insurance prices 
to unsustainable levels. This means that, by raising the insurance premia, the set of companies able 
to take insurance at the higher level may change, in particular when companies are facing economic 
and financial difficulties and they need it more. The result is that by raising insurance premia it 
generates a lower rate of return (due to higher claims) that at the lower price level, when the 
increased default risk is accounted for. This is the well known problem of "adverse selection". 
What we observe is that the failure of the price system to handle risk-bearing adequately leads to 
a diminished use of market prices, even in contexts where they would be most usefu\21. 
Apparently this principle explains the limitations of both credit insurance in particular and 
risk-shifting through the market in general. The problem is that the insurer, or more broadly, the 
risk bearer cannot completely define his risks; in most circumstances he only observes a result 
which is a mixture of the unavoidable risks, against which he is willing to insure and human 
decision. 
If the motives of the insured are to reduce losses, then the insurance company has little 
problem. but if the insurance policy may, as we have seen, lead to a motive for increased loss, and 
then the insurer or risk-bearer is bearing socially unnecessary costs. Either he will refrain from 
insuring or he will resort to direct inspection and control, to make as certain as he can that the 
insured is minimizing all losses (Arrow, 1971). 
Continuation of the firm is itself a risky investment. The coalition of insured creditors and 
shareholders gets the upside benefit, while misinformed insurers disproportionately bear the 
downside costs. Since the bankruptcy decision rests with managers and creditors, the firm's 
insurers cannot prevent it from continuing to operate, as long as premia is paid. When firms finally 
enter bankruptcy, most or all of their assets are subject to secured creditors, so that payoff rates 
to unsecured creditors and recoveries by insurance companies are very low22 • 
21 That in turn may cause problems of what we can call ·insurance rationing". 
22 White (1988) found that unsecured crsditors in the US rsceived an average payoff rate of 
only 4 percent. 
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5. Some empirical results. 
Empirical tests of the use and effects of credit insurance generally use indirect methods 
based on proxies and other methods with an assumed relationship to credit insurance. It·s not easy 
to obtain data directly from insurers because of their reluctance to provide the relevant figures for 
the companies involved and the cost of cover under different circumstances. A more rigorous 
empirical approach is difficult to employ due to the lack of proper information. The limitations of 
the analysis should, therefore, to be borne in mind. 
The main source of information regarding companies' insurance costs is the "Cost of Risk 
Survey", published by RIMS (Risk and Insurance Management Society) every year in the United 
States and Canada. The survey documents the total cost of risk for all participants, and by industry 
group (27) and financial size. Data collected for years 1990 and 1991 was sent to more than 
4200 members of the organization, with a total response over 800 firms (around 20% of the total), 
one hundred of them Canadian. 
Export and Domestic Credit Insurance premium data was collected for almost 400 
companies under the generic name of Property Risk Financing Costs and represented on average 
0,01861 of the firms total revenues (0,02228 in 1990) and 0,01169 of total assets (0,00916 in 
1990), a figure higher than all oth~r property lines except for property damage. 
A research, similar in pattern to RIMS' survey, was conducted in 1991, to cover more than 
2000 companies all over Spain, by Mapfre and AGERS23 (the Spanish Association of Risk and 
Insurance Management) to find out the types of insurance being purchased by Spanish corporations 
and the average cost of cover (including administrative costs). 
The results of this survey, regarding Credit Insurance, are as follows: 
Table 3 
Kind of Insurance Purchased Percentage of Companies Insured (%) 
Credit Insurance 8,2% 
Export Credit Insurance 23,0% 
Financial Guarantee Insurance 16,7% 
Exchange Risk Insurance 16,7% 
Empirical evidence therefore suggests, that only one out of six of companies purchases 
credit related insurance. In fact export credit insurance is being favored by policyholders, with 
domestic credit insurance lagging far behind. There are several explanations for these facts as 
exports are considered riskier than domestic sales, and export credit insurance is often subsidized 
by Government's agencies, to cover for political risk (the importer's country being unable or 
unwilling to pay). 
Insurance cost is the highest among the risks covered by corporations with premia of more 
than 0,10% (0,112 %) of sales (the cost of all risk covered is around 1,00%, including 
administrative costs), with Construction and Public Works companies paying the higher premia 
(0,2411 %). Evidence also suggests than the size of the company may also affect the cost of 
insurance being lower for smaller firms (0,0795%) that for big corporations (0,1589%), as 
predicted by theory. 
23 Hoya, H. D. (1993); "Bl coete de loe rieegoe en la empreea eepanola. 1991'; Gerencia de 
Rieegoe; pp. 57-65. Pundaci6n Mapfre BBtudioe, Madrid 
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The exteded opinion is that credit risk in spite of its efective role to switch risk from firms 
and creditors to insurance companies, is not purchased by corporations as expected, mainly due 
to the "adverse selection" and "moral hazard" problems already mentioned that lead insurance 
companies to increase premia during turbulent periods of the economy. 
A practical way to overcome these problems is to pool insurance policies across a large 
number of borrowers and in a longer span of time. Diversification eliminates the risk of insuring in 
anyone firm and allows insurance companies to offer creditors standard insurance contracts. The 
need for close monitoring is therefore eliminated by the ability of insurers to diversify risks. 
However and as mentioned earlier, this is not easy in many countries, due to lack of information 
regarding borrower's characteristics and activities. 
To the extent that credit risk is individual specific, it implies that credit markets cannot 
function as anonymous, price-taking markets in the neoclassical sense. In general, both the identity 
of the seller and the Quantity of credit sold are crucial determinants of its value. The importance 
of the seller's identity and characteristics also impies a role for information production, wich may 
be an important service provided by financial intermediaries. Many private firms provide information 
regarding the relative credit risk of issued by corporations (as Moody's and Standard & Poor's 
rating agencies among others) but few provide reliable services regarding trade credit of individual 
firms. 
Another means is to share the risks with the insured themselves. If a complete absence of 
risk-shifting is bad because inhibits the undertaking of risky enterprises and if the total risk-shifting 
is bad because it reduces the incentives for their success, then it is reasonable to suggest that 
partial risk-shifting might be the best. This is precisely what is meant by the coinsurance measures 
being taken by credit insurers in many countries. 
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5. Summary end concluding remarks. 
Company insolvencies have increased very sharply in the last few years, and currently stand 
at record levels in many countries. Although the combination of recession and high interest rates 
is likely to have been the main cause of this rise in defaults, the more moderate increases in 
company failures, which have accompanied more severe downturns in the past, suggests that other 
factors may also have been important. 
Several factors may severely affect corporate default. One important common determinant 
is the general economic conditions for business (GDP growth, inflation, etc.), another is the level 
of debt. Both capital leverage (debt as a proportion of assets) and income gearing (interest 
payments as a proportion of incomel, together with higher levels of indebtedness, may lead to 
insolvency. 
Recent developments in the theory of finance, have advanced considerably our 
understanding of the nature and role of debt. Although most of the theory is set out in terms of 
corporate finance, it is also directly applicable to financial institutions and accountancy. Many of 
the features indicated can be understood as means of overcoming uncertaintY, transaction costs, 
and incomplete contracts, arisingJrom asymmetric information between the parties concerned. 
Debt, unlike any other "commodity", entails a "promise" to pay an amount and the fulfilment of 
this promise is, by its nature, uncertain. Considering rational expectations and asymmetric 
information, there is no reason to assume that choices made by companies in the past are 
consistent with the observed results, hence the possibility of default. 
The best remedy for to avoid insolvency is to avoid distress in the first place but this 
requires successful management of the firm in all critical functions and, therefore, knowledge of 
the effects of a changing environment on the firm. The risk of bankruptcy and financial distress 
highlights the fact that conflicts of interest between stockholders and various fixed payment 
claimants exist. These conflicts exist because the firm's fixed claims bear default risk while 
stockholders have limited liability residual claims and influence the managerial decision process. 
The "adverse selection" argument for debt is simply that managers, acting in shareholders' 
interests, have better knowledge of expected future cash-flows than does the market. Asymmetric 
information, however, does not fully explain one aspect of corporate finance, the role of credit 
insurance in business insolvency. Credit insurance promise creditors fixed returns so long as the 
company is solvent and transfers the assets to the insurers in the event of insolvency. The lack of 
adequate control, by lenders and creditors, on management behavior, because of the credit risk 
cover, may lead to "moral hazard" problems that can eventually end in the company insolvency. 
Bankruptcy as such, therefore, does not create wealth transfers to shareholders or 
undermine the provisions of debt finance, but it creates a conflict of interest between creditors and 
shareholders. 
Given the relevance of this concept and application in company valuation we suggest that 
limited liability and insurance contracts may have an important role to play in companies' 
insolvency. In particular, the use of credit insurance is likely to reduce the firms' cost of capital and 
thus the probability of default. Asymmetric information and "moral hazard" problems should be 
taken into account, as they also affect credit insurance. Insurance companies, due to specialization 
and economies of scale, are bener suited for screening and monitoring functions than individuals. 
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